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Abstract 
 
 In the early morning of June 30, 2006, Israeli warplanes struck a civilian 
apartment complex in Qana, Lebanon, killing some 28 persons, none of whom were 
thought to have been Hezbollah militants.  Footage of the attack was streamed instantly 
across the world, leading many to decry Israel’s tactics in its conflict against Hezbollah.   
But did the attack actually violate the Laws of International Armed Conflict? Or, worse, 
does the attack epitomize the notion of an innocent murder—terrible, perhaps immoral, 
but lawful?  Furthermore, do Hezbollah’s violations of the LOIAC excuse reactionary 
violations by Israel? This paper offers an analysis of the incident at Qana, drawing from 
the LOIAC, reports by international observers, and statements from involved parties to 
determine that Israel’s attack did not likely transgress the LOIAC, demonstrating the 
limits of international law and its relative detachment from morality.   
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When bombing dug-outs or cellars, it was always wise to throw the bombs into them 
first and have a look around them after. But we had to be very careful in this village 
as there were civilians in some of the cellars. We shouted down to them to make sure. 
Another man and I shouted down one cellar twice and receiving no reply were just 
about to pull the pins out of our bombs when we heard a woman’s voice and a young 
lady came up the cellar steps…She and the members of her family…had not left [the 
cellar] for some days…If the young lady had not cried out when she did, we would 
have innocently murdered them all.1
 
I.   The Search for Legal Responsibility   
 
Tales like that above seem to be the exception rather than the rule in modern warfare.  
The increasing role of airpower and other long-range weapons2 may decrease the ability 
of belligerents to call out in search of civilians.3  Avoiding the killing of innocent 
civilians in keeping with the Laws of International Armed Conflict (LOIAC)4 often relies 
on well-meaning speculation known as “intelligence information.”5  In the worst cases, 
such information proves faulty. Similar to a grenade thrown in a cellar full of innocents, 
some modern militaries have sent munitions into structures housing only civilians.6  Yet 
                                                 
1 Frank Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (New York: 1966), 198, quoted in Michael Walzer, Just and 
Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 152.  
2 Good examples of this kind of weapons system are cruise-missiles or a Predator drone armed with 
Hellfire missiles. Such weapons can be exceedingly impersonal. They cannot “ask” if civilians are present 
before striking. The presence of civilians can only be discerned through intelligence obtained by pictures, 
signal-based information or human sources, among other means.    
3 Further information on this point can be found in Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normandm “The 
Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War,” 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 49, 91-92 (1994).  
4 For a discussion of the LOIAC, see Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.   
5 Brigadier General (Israel) Amir Eshel, “Israeli Defense Forces Press Conference Following the Kafr Qana 
Incident,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31, 2006 <http://www.mfa.gov.il /MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace /Terrorism +from +Lebanon-+Hizbullah/IDF+press +conference 
+following+the+Kafr+Qana+incident+30-Jul-2006.htm>.  
6 The United States killed some 290 civilians in a strike on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad in 1991.  
Thomas Keaney, “Collateral Damage in the Gulf War: Experiences and Lessons” (paper presented at a 
conference on the Use of Force at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, June, 2002) < http: //www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use%20of%20Force /June%202002 
/Keaney_Final.pdf> (19 November 2006).  Keaney writes that, “Hundreds of civilians were killed in the 
bombing of the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad, because targeteers did not know that civilians had taken 
shelter there.”  
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under the penumbra of the LOIAC, some of these attacks, though shockingly tragic, may 
be a form of “innocent murder.”   
The related principles of discrimination and proportionality are behind this reality. 
Explaining the interaction of the two principles, Leslie Green writes that “the most basic 
rule of armed conflict is that civilians and civilian objects must not be made the object of 
direct attack, although incidental injuries caused to such persons or objects in the course 
of a legitimate attack must be proportional.”7 These principles represent the evolution of 
traditional jus in bello (justice in war) thinking from moral principles to the status of 
codified international law.  A recent incident places this idea in context.    
 On July 30th, 2006, the world awoke to television images showcasing appalling 
destruction. Early that morning, Israeli warplanes demolished a civilian complex in Qana 
in its war against Hezbollah, killing at least 28 civilians.8  International news media 
beamed footage across the globe of charred human bodies mangled in a cascade of 
burning concrete.  Human rights organizations were quick to respond to the situation. 
Human Rights Watch declared that Israel had committed a “war crime”9 in the attack on 
Qana, inasmuch as it had violated the international proscription on “indiscriminate 
attacks.” 10 The organization’s claim is especially serious. Looking at the pictures of the 
destruction wrought at Qana, one hopes that the LOIAC would not allow this. And yet, 
                                                 
7 Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 2nd ed. (Manchester, UK: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), 124, quoted in Michael L. Gross, “Killing Civilians Intentionally: Double 
Effect, Reprisal, and Necessity in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 120, no. 4 (2005-2006): 
558, < http://poli.haifa.ac.il/~mgross/Killing%20Civilians%20Intentionally.pdf> (19 November 2006).  
8 “Counting the dead in Lebanon: A dangerous and often imprecise task,” The Associated Press, August 3, 
2006 in LexisNexis Academic <http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/>. 
9 Human Rights Watch, “Israel/Lebanon: Israel Responsible for Qana Attack,” news release, July 30, 2006 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/30/lebano13881.htm> (19 November 2006).  
10 Perhaps the most cogent presentation of this obligation is presented in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I 
of the Geneva Convention. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977 <http://www .unhchr.ch /html 
/menu3/b/93.htm> [hereinafter referred to as Protocol I].  
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having created such undeniable suffering and death, did Israel violate the LOIAC in its 
strike on Qana on July 30th, 2006? Or, did Israel’s strike epitomize the notion of an 
innocent murder—terrible, perhaps immoral, but lawful?   
 When analyzing this strike, any neutral critique must include the conduct of the 
Hezbollah militia.  Throughout the war lasting through the late summer of 2006, 
Hezbollah purposefully exploited Israel’s adherence to the LOIAC. Its fighters routinely 
commingled military and civilian persons and objects, taking advantage Israel’s 
adherence to the LOIAC.11  It may be that Israel also violated the letter and spirit of the 
LOIAC, as potentially evidenced in the following examination of its strike in Qana.  If 
this is the case, did Hezbollah’s own violations of the LOIAC excuse any of Israel’s 
violations?  
 Each of these questions will be treated in this essay.  This paper will first discuss 
the evolution and modern interpretation of those restraints in war discussed in the 
LOIAC. Next, Hezbollah’s actions during the 2006 conflict and its possible actions to 
precipitate the strike on Qana will be explored. Israel’s own conduct in executing the 
attack on Qana will then be evaluated according to the LOIAC.  Source-documents and 
the work of various commentators will favor prominently in the analysis.   
  This inquiry will reveal that Israel’s 2006 attack on Qana was very likely legal 
under the LOIAC. Though legal, the attack fits the mold of an innocent murder—an 
attack that was legal but inhumane.  In contrast to this conclusion, Hezbollah’s actions 
were likely illegal under the LOIAC. The illegality of Hezbollah’s conduct, though, does 
not lend legal legitimacy to the Israeli response.  
                                                 
11 SarahLeah Whitson, “Hezbollah Needs to Answer,” Human Rights Watch, October 5, 2006 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/05/lebano14335.htm> (19 November 2006).  
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II. Jus in Bello: Principles and Positivism  
 
When examining the legality of a contemporary incident of war, it is helpful to 
remember the relative novelty of this task.  Harvard Law School professor David 
Kennedy wrote recently about the “astonishing way the legitimacy of war and battlefield 
violence has come to be discussed in similar legal terms, by military professionals and 
outside commentators alike.”12 This confluence of terms “shapes the politics, as well as 
the practice, of warfare.”13 It was not always this way. Indeed, this development is 
largely a product of the trend, begun in the 19th century and strengthened in the 20th, 
promoting the creation of positive law relating to the conduct of states in war.  Before the 
evolution of positive law, most thinking on the subject existed in the form of moral 
arguments and principles.  
 The idea of the “just war” was first posited by Christian moralists, and Augustine 
in particular, during the waning years of the Roman Empire.14  Paul Ramsey suggests 
that just war theory originated from ruminations by Christian thinkers regarding “the 
ethics of Christian love.”15 Beginning with the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan,16 
it was reasoned that the pacifistic tendency inherent to the Christian faith did not 
necessarily override efforts to protect the weak like the beaten man on the road to 
Jericho.17  Indeed, the notion of proportionality derives from this paradox. Widely 
                                                 
12 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 7. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Paul Ramsey, The Just War (New York: University Press of America, 1983), 142.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Luke 10:25-37  
17 Ramsey, The Just War, 142-3.  
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considered the father of canonical just war theory,18 “Augustine argued for a 
proportionate response to the threat represented by the criminal (who injured the beaten 
man in the parable of the Good Samaritan) from carrying out his evil intention by 
defensive measures designed to thwart whatever the criminal may try.”19  
 Thomas Aquinas expanded Augustine’s ideas about just war.  Aquinas is credited 
with honing the conception of proper or right intention in war. He wrote that a sovereign 
must pursue war for one of two aims: “either the furthering of some good or an avoidance 
of some evil.”20 War made towards these objectives leaves little room to harm non-
combatants.21 After all, war must be made only to secure the safety of persons like the 
abused man in the parable of the Good Samaritan. Wars brought to ensure the security of 
the state also qualified as just. In this way, the principle of proportionality, with its 
attendant aim of protecting the weak in a war, came to be paired with the principle of 
non-combatant immunity.22 Later intellectuals would draw from eclectic sources—
among them, “natural law, international law, civil law, [and] divine law”—to build the 
framework upon which contemporary international law stands.23  
 The work of these scholars would advance the notion that a just war could not be 
an unlimited war. Thus, reasoned restraint in war became the hallmark of jus in bello 
considerations.24 Scholars such as the 16th century’s Hugo Grotius and Francisco de 
Vitoria were some of the first to elucidate these ideas of restraint.  Later thinkers, such as 
                                                 
18 James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religion and Secular Concepts  
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), 8.  
19 James Turner Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 4.  
20 Brother John Raymond, “The Just War Theory,” Monks of the Adoration, < http: //www. 
monksofadoration.org/justwar.html> (19 November 2006).  
21 Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just?, 4.  
22 Ibid.  
23 David Kennedy, Of War and Law, 48-9.  
24 Kennedy, Of War and Law, 48,. 
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Switzerland’s Emerich de Vattel, would expand such notions, using them to advance a 
more circumspect notion of limited conduct in war.25 Though the LOIAC owes its moral 
and intellectual core to those early theologians and scholars, the fairly recent trend of 
legal positivism has greatly affected the evolution of international humanitarian law.   
 Positivism asserts that principles of restraint in warfare should be agreed to and 
codified by those states and actors to whom it applies.  State-centric codes of military 
conduct precipitated earliest attempts at positivism. The Lieber Code governing the 
conduct of the Union Army in the American Civil war is foremost among such codes.  
Promulgated by President Lincoln in 1863, the Lieber Code applied jus in bello principles 
to the war against the Confederate forces. Certain provisions of the Code deserve 
attention.  
Article 16 narrowed the scope of military necessity by prohibiting “any acts of 
hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”26 Given the horrendous 
shelling of Atlanta and other tragedies, this prohibition may have been interpreted more 
as a suggestion than an obligation. The code also has its moral low-points. Starvation is 
legitimized as a weapon of war and the failure to encourage civilians to move out of a 
city before bombardment may be overlooked in favor of “surprise.”27 Even so, the Code 
“strongly influenced the further codification of the laws of war and the adoption of 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 53.  
26 United States of America, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
April 24, 1863,Art. 16  <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument>.  
27 Ibid., Arts. 17, 18.   
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similar regulations by other states,”28 such as the Hague Conventions to follow in 1899 
and 1907.29  
  The Hague Conventions set forth measures of restraint in warfare now regarded 
as reflective of customary law.30 “[I]nspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war,”31 
the states party to the convention advanced the seminal stipulation of what became the 
LOIAC: “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited.”32  The Conventions were not always followed. World Wars I and II showed 
the limits of positivism in the face of total war.  Only after the scourge of World War II 
would the international community agree to a series of conventions that, it was hoped, 
would not stand silently during the wars to follow.   
 Commonly known as “Geneva Law,” the Geneva Conventions are a series of four 
international agreements drawn up in 1949.33 The Conventions, inter alia, expand upon 
conceptions of non-combatant immunity and the principle of discrimination by providing 
                                                 
28 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Introduction [to the] ‘Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States,’” 1988 < http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/73cb71d18dc4372741256739003e6372 
/a25aa5871a04919bc12563cd002d65c5?OpenDocument> (19 November 2006).  
29 Some other influential agreements preceded the Hague Conventions. The St. Petersburg Declaration, for 
instance, banned the use of “dum-dum” bullets. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weigh,. Saint Petersburg, November 29, December 11, 1868. 
30 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague, July 29, 1899 < http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf 
/FULL /150?OpenDocument>; Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague, October 18, 1907 < 
http://www.icrc .org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument>.   
31  Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble, October 18, 1907 < http://www.icrc 
.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument>.   
32 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 22, July 29, 1899  < http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf 
/FULL /150?OpenDocument>.   
33 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Geneva, August 12, 1949; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, August 12, 1949; Convention (III) relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, August 12,1949; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, August 12, 1949. The text of each convention can be accessed at 
< http:// www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView#Victims%20of%20Armed%20Conflicts>.  
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enhanced protection to those categories of persons who are not party to a conflict or 
whose combatant status no longer holds.  These conventions were affected by an 
international agreement whose provisions will prove paramount in the inquiry at hand: 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.34     
 This first Additional Protocol, followed by a second Protocol which will not be 
discussed here,35 builds upon the principles enshrined in the Hague Conventions. Many 
of these provisions are strengthened while the occasional new provision is added.36 The 
provisions in Additional Protocol I most relevant to Israel’s strike on Qana are those 
discussing valid military objectives and the principle of discrimination.37 Though Israel 
and Hezbollah are not parties to Additional Protocol I, its provisions are “generally 
regarded as customary law” and thus binding even on non-signatories.38 Indeed, 
considerations of customary law cover “most of the rules of the LOIAC [that govern] the 
conduct of hostilities.”39 In the specific examinations that follow, Additional Protocol I 
and other facets of the LOIAC—comprising both codified and customary law—will be 
applied to the conduct of Israel and Hezbollah concerning the tragic incident at Qana.  
 
III. Before the Tragedy: Hezbollah’s Conduct in the Light of the LOIAC 
 
                                                 
34 Protocol I.   
35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Geneva, June 8, 1977 < http://www.icrc 
.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/475?OpenDocument>. 
36 It is fair to say that the prohibition of reprisals in Additional Protocol I is a “new” addition to the LOIAC. 
This prohibition is chiefly submitted in Article 6, Article 51 (6) and Article 56 (4).  
37 Protocol I, Arts. 48, 51. Article 48 contains the clearest formulation of the nexus of these two principles, 
discussing each of them under the important heading of a “Basic Rule.” 
38 Anthony Dworkin, “Apparent Violations of International Law During Israeli Actions in the West Bank,” 
Crimes of War Project, April 5, 2002 <http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-mideast2.html>. 
39 Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 5.  
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Hezbollah waged a war of asymmetry in its fight against Israel in July and August 
of 2006.  Facing an opponent with superior military might, Hezbollah depended on 
striking the Israeli forces at their weakest points, including their adherence to the LOIAC.  
The legal dimensions of Hezbollah’s conduct are many and varied.  This inquiry into the 
legality of their conduct will first discuss the applicability of the LOIAC to Hezbollah. 
Finding that the LOAIC does apply, certain principles from this body of law will be 
applied to Hezbollah’s actions, particularly those that could have precipitated the Israeli 
attack on Qana.   
Determining whether the LOAIC applies to Hezbollah’s conduct first requires 
determining whether the LOIAC applied to the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.  
The LOIAC applies to two main forms of armed conflicts: “international and non-
international.”40 Not being a conflict between two states, the hostilities between 
Hezbollah and Israel following the former’s capture of two Israeli soldiers on July 12th, 
2006 may qualify as a non-international armed conflict.  The International Committee of 
the Red Cross defines this category of armed conflict as involving “hostilities between 
government armed forces and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
state.”41  The phrase, “such groups within a state,” appears to preclude the Israeli-
Hezbollah conflict. A recent law review article submits the term “extra-state armed 
conflict” to denote a conflict between a state and a non-state actor.42  Deciphering the 
                                                 
40 “The Relevance of IHL (International Humanitarian Law) in the Context of Terrorism,” Official 
Statement, International Committee of the Red Cross, July 21, 2005 < http://www.icrc.org 
/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705>.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Roy S. Schondorf, “Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?” 37 NYU 
Journal of Law and International Politics, 1-78 (2004).   
11
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applicability of the LOIAC in this case may not require delving into these legal 
difficulties.  
It seems that the LOIAC explicitly applies to Israel but applies to Hezbollah only 
implicitly, chiefly through the ability of Israel (or another state) to prosecute Hezbollah 
fighters who commit war crimes through universal jurisdiction.43 One culprit is to blame 
for this incongruence: the fact that the LOIAC “in all circumstances bind all states.”44 
Non-state entities like Hezbollah fall outside of the traditional, state-centric conceptions 
of conflict.45  Even so, states may take it upon themselves to try and punish those in 
Hezbollah who commit crimes of war or crimes against humanity.46 In this way, each 
party to the conflict has an obligation to adhere to the LOIAC—one out of international 
legal compulsion, the other, if for no better reason, out of fear of possible punishment. 
International law also avoids awarding legal personality to an organization like 
Hezbollah.  The sovereign state of Lebanon is legally responsible for Hezbollah’s 
conduct in the international scene, evidenced by United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1559 that calls on the Lebanese government to assert its control over its state 
and disband the militias therein.47  
But Hezbollah is directly responsible to some provisions of the LOIOAC. As a 
party to a conflict, Hezbollah has an obligation to follow those tenets of the LOIAC 
                                                 
43 Robbie Sabel, “Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict,” Jurist: Legal News and 
Research, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, July 27, 2006 < http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy 
/2006/07/hezbollah-israel-lebanon-and-law-of.php#8>.  
44 Ibid. Emphasis mine.  
45 One could submit that Hezbollah ought not to be considered as a non-state actor under the LOIAC, 
inasmuch as it receives much of its funding from the Iranian regime.  Although Hezbollah may be a proxy 
of Iran, it is a self-governing entity capable of coordinating and directing planned attacks against a military 
opponent. It has all the characteristics of an “armed group” and more.  
46 Dr. Sabel expands on this point while discussing the applicability of the LOIAC to Hezbollah. Sabel, 
“Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict,” University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  
47 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1559, S/RES/1559 (2004), September 2, 2004 < http: 
//daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/ 498/92/PDF /N0449892.pdf?OpenElement>.  
12
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generally regarded as customary law.48 This includes Common Article Three of the 
Geneva Conventions and the many provisions of Protocol I.49  Further validating this 
claim, Amnesty International reported recently that Hezbollah has “accepted some of the 
core rules of international humanitarian law” in the past. One such agreement concluded 
in 1996 obligated Hezbollah to ensure that “under no circumstances will civilians be the 
target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations 
will not be used as launching grounds for attacks.”50 Though this particular agreement is 
no longer enforced, it demonstrates Hezbollah’s past willingness to accept and follow 
some common standards of International Humanitarian Law. Having established that the 
LOIAC do apply to Hezbollah, its conduct in and around the incident at Qana merits 
careful evaluation.  
Judging Hezbollah’s conduct—in wartime or anytime—is difficult. One recent 
article by Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that “little is known about the conduct of 
[Hezbollah’s] forces inside Lebanon and whether its own actions put Lebanese civilians 
at risk.”51  Despite this qualifying statement, the article notes that HRW researchers 
found numerous violations of the LOIAC by Hezbollah. These acts included “storing 
weapons” and conducting operations in “civilian homes” and its habit of “firing rockets 
from populated areas.”52 These infractions controvert the LOIAC and place Lebanese 
                                                 
48 Israel/Lebanon: Out of All Proportion, Civilians Bear the Brunt of War, Amnesty International, 
November 21, 2006 < http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE020332006>. 
49 Even the United States considers most of Protocol I reflective of customary law. Even so, the United 
States, like Israel, has yet to ratify the convention. Jefferson D. Reynolds, “Collateral Damage on the 21st 
Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict and the Struggle for a Moral High 
Ground,” 56 A.F.L. Rev. 1, 10 (2005). 
50 United States of American, Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding, April 26, 1996 < http: 
//telaviv.usembassy.gov/publish/peace /documents/ceasefire_understanding.html>.  
51 Whitson, “Hezbollah Needs to Answer.” 
52 Ibid.  
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civilians at incredible risk. Yet it is the intentional operational of offensive weapons from 
within the civilian population that applies most directly to the Israeli strike on Qana.  
   This practice, inter alia, caused Hezbollah to violate its obligation to discriminate 
in war and make proper preparations for defense.53 Though these practices certainly did 
not ‘cause’ or ‘necessitate’ the tragedy at Qana, they may have made such an occurrence 
more likely.  A video accessible through the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs displays 
an example of Hezbollah’s failure to abide by “basic rule” of Additional Protocol I: the 
duty of belligerents to “distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives.”54 Taken by an Israeli drone during the 
conflict, the film shows a Hezbollah mobile rocket launcher firing its weapons near Qana, 
only to flee into a civilian structure after depleting its rounds.55 Brigadier General Amir 
Eshel, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force, stated in a press conference following the 
attacks on Qana that “approximately 150 missiles have been fired from [the] immediate 
environs” of Qana and even “inside the village itself.”56   
 Firing missiles from inside the town and hiding launchers within civilian facilities 
explicitly violates Article 58’s requirement for belligerents to take “precautions against 
the effect of attacks.”57 Hezbollah’s repeated use of civilian centers in southern Lebanon 
as its basis of operations controverts the prohibition on “locating military objectives 
                                                 
53 Protocol I, Art.48, Art. 58(b).  
54 Protocol I, Art. 48.  
55 “Hezbollah Claims They Don’t Shoot Rockets Out of Kafr Qana,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
online video from a military drone, July 31, 2006 <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Pages /MediaPlayer 
.aspx?MediaUrl=/NR/rdonlyres/11A0342E-ECB3-4F80-A282-D9A853CA48E1 /0/qana 
.wmv&LANGUAGE_NAME=En> (17 November 2006). 
56 Brigadier General Amir Eshel, “Israeli Defense Forces Press Conference Following the Kafr Qana 
Incident,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31, 2006 <http://www.mfa.gov.il /MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace /Terrorism +from +Lebanon-+Hizbullah/IDF+press +conference +following 
+the+Kafr+Qana+incident+30-Jul-2006.htm> (17 November 2006). 
57 Protocol I, Art. 58. 
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within or near densely populated areas.”58 When such actions occur, it is too often the 
civilian population that truly suffers the consequences.  
The Lebanese population paid dearly for these violations of the LOIAC by 
Hezbollah.59 Commingling military and civilian operations contributed to the legitimacy 
of attacks on Lebanese civilians by Israel, inasmuch as the presence of military forces 
makes such civilian areas legal targets under the LOIAC. Article 51 of Additional 
Protocol I, in a harsh concession to the realities of war, states that “the presence or 
movements of the civilian population” cannot be used to “render certain…areas immune 
from military operations.”60  An attack on targets where military personnel or equipment 
are known to exist alongside civilians, if it would “make an effective contribution to 
military action,” would therefore be lawful.61  
The important, though imprecise, exception to this rule occurs when any 
“incidental”62 effect on civilians would be “excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.”63 When Hezbollah commingled military and 
civilian assets, its opponents gained legal authorization (in most cases) to strike these 
areas as long as the incidental damage expected fell short of the target’s importance. This 
balancing act requires an unscientific calculus, one in which the value of potentially 
innocent human lives are weighed according to the value of military objectives. As 
realized shockingly in the attack on Qana, the scales of war sometimes favor the latter 
over the former with devastating results.   
                                                 
58 Protocol I, Art. 58(b). 
59 Amnesty International reports that 1,191 Lebanese civilians perished in the war and many thousands 
more were injured. Israel/Lebanon: Out of All Proportion, Civilians Bear the Brunt of War, Amnesty 
International, November 21, 2006 < http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE020332006>. 
60 Protocol I, Art. 51(7).  
61 Protocol I, Art. 52(2).  
62 Protocol I, Art, 51 (5)(b)). 
63 Protocol I, Art. 52(2).  
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 Hezbollah’s efforts potentially weighed down the scale of military necessity on 
the part of Israel. Even so, Hezbollah’s actions cannot be thought to legitimize any 
possible Israeli violation of the LOIAC.  Hezbollah violated several provisions of the 
LOIAC—the principle of discrimination and the duty to take precautions to protect 
civilians when defending an area, chief among these—in its fight against Israel. Though 
the exact actions of Hezbollah before the strike on Qana are not publicly known, it 
appears that Hezbollah conducted offensive operations from the city. Thus, some 
structures that would have otherwise been protected under international law may not have 
been. The following analysis explores whether Hezbollah’s opponent violated the LOIAC 
in its own actions, especially in its disturbing strike on Qana.    
 
IV. Behind the Tragedy: The Legality of the Israeli Strike on Qana 
 
Assessing whether Israel acted lawfully in its attack on the house in Qana requires 
noting the principles and provisions of the LOIAC that pertain to this type of offensive 
operation.  A host of legal principles apply to strikes against civilian centers within a 
densely populated area.  These notions affect the legality of Israel’s decision to strike 
several targets in Qana, among them the structure that became the tomb of 28 civilians, 
none of whom are thought to have been combatants.64   
This inquiry will examine only those legal considerations that should guide a 
strike of this nature. Among the most important factors to consider are military necessity 
and the principles of proportionality and discrimination. A conclusion on the legality of 
                                                 
64 Israel/Lebanon: Out of All Proportion, Civilians Bear the Brunt of War, Amnesty International, 
November 21, 2006 < http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE020332006>. 
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Israel’s strike in Qana will be reached upon consideration of legal sources, the input of 
humanitarian organizations and freely available descriptions of the strike and the 
subsequent investigation by the Israeli government.  
In its completed inquiry into the “July 30th Incident at Qana,” the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) declared that the house in Qana was “targeted in accordance with the 
military’s guidelines regarding the use of fire against suspicious structures inside villages 
whose residents have been warned to evacuate and which were adjacent to areas from 
where rockets were fired towards Israel.”65 Stated succinctly, the house was viewed as a 
legitimate military objective.  But can a strike against a military objective that ends in the 
deaths of twenty-eight noncombatants be lawful under international law?  
The definition of military necessity helps to answer this question.  As discussed 
above, Additional Protocol I presents a definition of military objective that is commonly 
regarded as being customary law66: “those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture, neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage.”67  
On the basis of this definition, the legality of the strike in Qana becomes 
somewhat clearer. Two key inquiries guide the inquiry: 1) why Israeli intelligence 
perceived that the “nature, location, purpose,” of this structure would “make an effective 
                                                 
65 “Fire” is a military term that denotes the use of weaponry to affect lethal force. Israeli Defense Forces, 
“Completion of Inquiry into July 30 Qana Incident,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2, 2006 < 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/Completion+of+inquiry+into+July+30+inci
dent+in+Qana+2-Aug-2006.htm> (15 November 2006).  
66 Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of Armed Conflict, 83.  
67 Protocol I, Art. 52 (2).  
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contribution to military action” if struck, and 2) what “definite military advantage” was 
sought in the destruction of this structure.68   
An Israeli press conference relayed what its intelligence considered to be the 
“purpose” of the house.69 It believed that the house was being used “as a hiding place for 
terrorists”  and “was not inhabited by civilians.”70 Thus, striking the house would likely 
kill Hezbollah militants and possibly deter future rocket attacks from the area. These 
outcomes could effectively contribute to military actions by destabilizing Hezbollah’s 
base of operations and disrupting the organization’s ability to launch attacks from Qana.  
Of course, these intelligence assumptions proved incorrect.  
The second key inquiry, that of “definite military advantage,” relates to the 
military objectives sought through the strike. This “definite advantage” might center on 
the destruction of a mobile rocket launcher or a militant trained in the use of an RPG that 
might prove deadly to invading IDF forces. According to the information Israel released 
on the incident, it appears to have sought legitimate objectives and even a “definite 
military advantage” in the attack. But these advantages proved non-existent.  Knowing 
now that the house in Qana should have been classified as a civilian structure (and thus 
subject to protections from intentional attack by the LOIAC,71 did Israel violate the 
LOIAC in this strike? Answering this question requires analysis of the related principles 
of proportionality and discrimination.  
                                                 
68 Ibid.  
69 Israeli Defense Forces, “Completion of Inquiry into July 30 Qana Incident,” Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, August 2, 2006 <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006 /Completion 
+of+inquiry+into+July+30+incident+in+Qana+2-Aug-2006.htm> (15 November 2006). 
70 Ibid.  
71 Protocol I, Art. 48.  
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Proportionality prohibits attacks which “may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects…which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”72 This definition 
precludes any attack that could be expected to produce catastrophic consequences. The 
definition presumes that attacks will not be deliberately directed against civilians in its 
use of the term “incidental.”  
These considerations in mind, Qana seems the prototypical example of an attack 
prohibited by the principle of proportion. Perhaps the Israeli attack would have been 
legally justified had it been attempting to kill Hassan Nasrallah73 or another figure whose 
death might end the hostilities. Israel gave no indications that the military objectives it 
sought were so great as to make the deaths of 28 civilians less “excessive” on balance. 
Yet a closer reading of the definition of proportionality in Additional Protocol I reveals 
that Israel may not have violated the legal proscription on disproportionate attacks.  
The first words of the definition of proportionality, “may be expected to cause” 
mean that intentions—and not effects—are the basis for judging disproportionate conduct 
in war. Thus, it is not enough for 28 civilians to have perished following a strike based on 
flawed intelligence.  General Eshel’s comments to the press following the Qana incident 
highlight this reality. He notes that “had we known there [were] uninvolved persons, 
certainly this number, we would not have attacked.”74   Assuming that Israel told the 
truth in its press releases after the event and did not intend to kill civilians in the house in 
                                                 
72 Protocol I, Art. 51 (5)(b)).  
73 Hassan Nasrallah is the Secretary General of Hezbollah.  
74 General Amir Eshel, “Israeli Defense Forces Press Conference Following the Kaft Qana Incident.” 
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Qana, it did not violate the principle of proportionality.75 The grotesque consequences of 
its actions are counter-balanced by its legally defensible intentions.  Does the principle of 
discrimination similarly refuse to condemn Israel’s actions?  
Like the principle of proportionality, violations of the principle of discrimination 
do not rest on the “body count” resulting from attacks.76 Article 51 (4) of Additional 
Protocol I defines prohibited indiscriminate attacks according to three broad categories. 
The first category of attacks, “those which are not directed at a specific military 
objective,” is relevant to the instant analysis.77 Yoram Dinstein writes that “the key to a 
finding that a given attack has been indiscriminate is the state of mind of the attacker.”78 
This finding differs slightly from the analysis of violations of the principle of 
proportionality. To offend the principle of discrimination, one must prove that the 
belligerent was primarily unconcerned with the damage done to civilians in an attack. 
Perhaps the belligerent, for example, denies “that there are any noncombatants” in a 
conflict and thus no civilians to attack.79 William V. O’Brien notes that denial occurs 
often among revolutionaries and in counter-insurgency campaigns.80   
It should come as no surprise, then, that the Israeli Minister of Justice declared on 
July 27th that “All those now in south Lebanon are terrorists who are related in some way 
to Hizbullah.”81 Besides being manifestly false,82 Minister Ramon’s words provide the 
                                                 
75 If it can be proven that Israeli war planners knew of the Lebanese civilians in the house and still 
recommended the strike in support of a relatively insignificant military objective (like killing one 19-year-
old militant, for instance), then Israel may have violated the principle of proportionality.  
76 Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of Armed Conflict, 117.  
77 Protocol I, Art. 51 (4)(a).  
78 Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of Armed Conflict, 116.  
79 William V. O’Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 179.  
80 Ibid.  
81 “Israel Approves Calling up [to] 30,000 Reservists,” CTV News, July 27, 2006 < http://www.ctv.ca/ 
servletArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060725/Israel_lebanon_fighting_060727/20060727?hub=CTVNew
sAt11>.  
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strongest evidence to suggest that Israel may have violated the principle of discrimination 
in its war against Hezbollah. If the Israeli military acted in the operational mindset that 
noncombatants were nonexistent, Israeli war planners may not have given sufficient 
concern to the possibility of civilian deaths or injuries. Perhaps this was the case in the 
strike on Qana. The circumstances are suspicious, as the Justice Minister’s comments 
were voiced a mere two days before the eve of the attack. Even so, no specific 
information exists to establish a causal connection between his words and the attack 
itself. Certainly, an inquiry into this matter must be made. Only by examining the true 
intentions of the strike at Qana can justice be done for the families of those who lost 
loved ones beneath the rubble of that house. This is a form of justice which the LOIAC, 
per se, is not designed to effectuate.  
 Therefore, examining the LOAIC shows that Israel did not likely commit a war 
crime in its attack on Qana.83 Should the IDF’s press releases and inquiries following the 
incident reflect the facts behind the incident, Israel does not appear to have committed a 
violation of the LOIAC. Specifically, the IDF purported to have a legally defensible 
military objective in mind and did appear to be unaware of the presence of the 28 
civilians. Most importantly, no publicly available information proves that Israel’s 
intention in the strike was something other than the pursuit of genuine military advantage.  
                                                                                                                                                 
82 Amnesty International’s report presents numerous stories of Lebanese civilians who genuinely appear to 
have been uninvolved with Hezbollah’s activities but were still struck by Israeli attacks. Israel/Lebanon: 
Out of All Proportion, Civilians Bear the Brunt of War, Amnesty International.  
83 Of course, this conclusion could be possibly changed by finding any link between Minster Ramon’s 
declaration and the military’s actions in Qana. To prove a war crime, one must prove that Israel either knew 
of the civilians at Qana—and did not care about them—or did not know of the civilians—and did not care 
to learn of their existence.  
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Israel seems to have acted based upon evidence that can only be evaluated in the context 
of the “circumstances ruling at the time.”84    
 Despite such evidence against any overt LOIAC violation, an inquiry should be 
made into the link between Minister Ramon’s comment and the incident at Qana a few 
days later. His words were nearly tantamount to a declaration that southern Lebanon 
qualified as a “free-fire zone,” in the words of Human Rights Watch Executive Director 
Kenneth Roth.85 The effects of this declaration must be investigated and the results made 
public. These results, of course, are likely to be of little solace to those who suffered in 
the tragedy at Qana.  
 
V. To Condone or Condemn: Humanity and the LOIAC 
 
 Israel may not be legally culpable for its strike on Qana but legality, in this sense, 
is detached from morality. The LOIAC do not intend to end suffering and death in war, 
only to reduce and control it. This examination should not be seen as “legally 
legitimizing” Israel’s actions in Qana. Rather, this examination proves that the LOIAC do 
provide a sound prism through which questions of law can be decided.   
 Hezbollah’s conduct in its 2006 conflict against Israel violated numerous 
provisions and principles of the LOAIC. Its refusal to fight apart from the Lebanese 
civilians—those whom Hezbollah purports to protect—evidences an abject disregard for 
international law, if not common morality altogether. These actions contributed to Israel 
killing many innocent civilians in the war by making it more difficult for IDF forces to 
                                                 
84 Protocol I, Art. 52 (2). 
85 “Israel/Lebanon: Israel Responsible for Qana Attack,” Human Rights Watch, news release, July 30, 2006 
< http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/30/lebano13881.htm> (21 November 2006). 
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distinguish civilian objects and persons from military object and combatants. Israeli 
Minister of Defense Ramon was wrong to assert that every Lebanese left in southern 
Lebanon was a combatant but he was right to hint that civilians and combatants looked 
very much alike. Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s repeated violations of the LOAC—including 
its operation of offensive weapons from civilian centers—do not excuse a single violation 
of the LOIAC by Israel.  
 And finally, the LOIAC does not attempt to moralize war. Instead, the LOIAC 
attempts to humanize war by establishing commonly-agreed upon grounds to legally 
evaluate the conduct of humans whose goal is to do each other harm. The humanizing 
force of the LOIAC, with its emphasis on reasoned restraint in war and on the protection 
of the unprotected, can be difficult to see through the smoke and fire of attacks that do 
not exhibit the hallmarks of restraint.   
 It can be similarly difficult to see how the LOIAC would ‘legitimize’ the tragedy 
of Qana. One wonders why the LOIAC would stand silently as Israel committed such 
terrible, if innocent, murder. It must be known, though, that the LOIAC does not 
condemn Israel for its strike on Qana—but neither does the LOIAC condone it.86  
 
 
                                                 
86 By stating that the LOAIC does not “condone” the strike on Qana, I mean that the LOIAC does not make 
the attack “permissible.” Innocents will be killed in war. This does not mean, however, that it is  
“ok” or “permissible” for innocents to be killed in every situation. The LOIAC cannot legally condemn 
Israel for the strike but its failure to condemn Israel does not mean that it underhandedly allows the strike. 
World public opinion and other factors that cannot be codified all contribute to whether or not an attack 
like this is condoned. The LOIAC makes no such interpretation.  
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